

**FINAL REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
WAR AND THE RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK**

RELIGION AMONG AMERICAN MEN. (Ready.)

THE MISSIONARY OUTLOOK IN THE LIGHT OF THE WAR. (Ready.)

THE CHURCH AND INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION.

**THE TEACHING WORK OF THE CHURCH IN THE LIGHT OF THE
PRESENT SITUATION.**

PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN UNITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE WAR.

**THE
MISSIONARY OUTLOOK
IN THE LIGHT OF
THE WAR**

**THE COMMITTEE ON THE WAR
AND THE RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK**

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CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR AND THE MISSIONARY OUTLOOK IN CHINA

In the discussion of this subject three factors need to be kept clear: first, the exact changes in international relationships and internal conditions in China due to the war; secondly, the bearing of the war on tendencies in missions already evident at the outbreak of the war; thirdly, the effect of the post-bellum political changes upon the missionary situation.

I. POLITICAL CHANGES

China joined the Allies against Germany in the third year of the war. When hostilities first broke out, she declared her neutrality after an abortive attempt to join Japan in the ousting of the Germans from Tsingtao. In November, 1915, she seriously proposed joining the Allies, but this step was not at that time approved. In February, 1917, following the lead of America, she protested against Germany's submarine warfare and on March 14th severed relations with Germany. Five months later, on August 14, 1917, after a violent disagreement between the executive and legislative branches of the Government, she declared war on Germany and Austria. Her activities were confined to the sending of labor battalions to Europe, 175,000 in number, to sending troops to Siberia, to the taking over of German and Austrian property, and in the spring of 1919 to the repatriation of practically all enemy aliens. By the terms of the peace treaty China is relieved of further payment of Boxer

indemnities to Germany and of any treaty obligations with Germany and Austria.

The war-time changes in China's relations with Japan were even more significant than in those with Germany. In the first month of the war Japan declared war on Germany, after sending an ultimatum demanding the turning over of Tsingtao to Japan, with a view to its eventual restoration to China. In the second month Japan landed troops in Shantung, who established themselves at strategic points throughout the province and two months later, on November 7th, forced the surrender of Tsingtao, the German stronghold. Two weeks afterward the Twenty-One Demands were formulated, by which she sought to take over Germany's rights in Shantung, to consolidate the gains made in Manchuria and Mongolia in the Russo-Japanese War, to secure a controlling share in China's iron output, to mark out a new sphere of interest in Fukien and invade the British sphere in the Yangtze Valley, and by the appointment of military, political, and financial advisers, and by participation in the control of the national police and in the supply of munitions of war, to make China, with all its resources, tributary to Japan. These demands were presented secretly in the following month, January, 1915. and after four months' negotiation, an acceptance of the first four groups was forced through by an ultimatum of war, the last and most extreme group being deferred for future discussion. The next year, 1916, Japan concluded a secret alliance with her one-time enemy, Russia, in which they mutually agreed to assist each other in defending their respective possessions in China against any action by a third power. In February and March, 1917, secret agreements were made with England, France, Russia, and Italy, whereby these nations gave formal approval to the Japanese claim to the German holdings in Shantung. In the fall of 1917, the Lansing-Ishii agreement between Japan and America relating to China

was signed, whereby Japan's special interests in China were recognized and a reaffirmation was made by both countries of their adhesion to the open-door policy and the territorial integrity of China. In October, 1917, a civil administration instead of a military one was set up by the Japanese in Shantung. In September, 1918, a secret agreement was made by the Japanese Government with certain Chinese officials, whereby the latter recognized Japan's further claims to previous German railway rights in and near Shantung. In addition, Japanese financial interests were vigorously pushed through loans and investments, the totals reaching over \$300,000,000 in these two years. Finally at the Peace Conference, after a direct clash between the representatives of China and Japan, the Japanese claims to the German holdings in China based on the secret treaties and agreements already mentioned were conceded, China at the last moment refusing to sign the treaty containing these provisions as to Shantung. The net result of the war as it affected Japan and China was obviously a decided advance of Japanese interests and possessions in China. As a result of her strategic position and control of communications in Korea, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Shantung, Japan has a correspondingly increased measure of economic and political control over North China and Peking.

China's relations with the United States during the war were especially close. She trusted America and followed her into the war largely through the influence and persuasion of the American minister at Peking. President Wilson's speeches were translated into Chinese and created widespread admiration and interest. It is only stating facts to say that the Lansing-Ishii agreement, which many Chinese interpret as an American-Japanese alliance and a tacit consent on the part of America to Japan's policies in China, and more recently the approval by the American delegates of the Shantung settlement, have not been in line with the Chinese expectations or

hopes in American friendship and much-emphasized national ideals.

In her relations to the Allies in general and to the League of Nations, China is in a difficult position. With the general ideals and aims of the Allies and the League, as expressed to them, practically all Chinese are in sympathy. Against the particular application of these principles to China as expressed in the secret agreements of 1917 and in the Shantung articles, all patriotic Chinese vehemently protest. Their feeling is expressed in a statement of the students explaining the nation-wide movement of protest, following the announcement of the Shantung settlement. One paragraph of this document reads:

"A Great War has been fought in Europe. On the fields of France and Belgium the sons of the great nations of the West have given their lives that democracy and justice might exist upon the earth. Throughout the world like the voice of a prophet has gone the word of Woodrow Wilson, strengthening the weak and giving courage to the struggling. And the Chinese people have listened and they too have heard. They have been told that their four-thousand-year-old doctrine that peace is the greatest of all aims of a nation has become the slogan of mankind. They have been told that in the dispensation which is to be made after the war, unmilitaristic nations like China would have an opportunity to develop their culture, their industry, their civilization, unhampered. They have been told that secret covenants and forced agreements would not be recognized. They looked for the dawn of this new Messiah; but no sun rose for China. Even the cradle of the nation was stolen."

Viewed from the immediate present, the resulting situation is most confusing and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the future, there are great possibilities in the League of Nations if it will include the Orient as well as the Occident in a program of impartial justice.

In internal affairs the Chinese Republic has passed

through some significant phases during the war. Two attempts were made to restore the monarchy, the first by Yuan Shih-kai in the winter of 1915-1916, his imperial regime lasting eighty days; the second by Chang Hsun in 1917 in an attempted restoration of the Manchu boy prince, whose regime lasted eight days. The power of the military governors, who control their own soldiers, has become increasingly felt. In 1918 the members of the parliament which had been dissolved the previous year met at Canton, while another parliament was convened at Peking. Thus far efforts to bring the two governments together have failed. Hsu Shih-chang was elected president by the northern parliament in September, 1918, but as yet his election has not been recognized by the south. The resulting discord and lack of unity have been a disappointment to all friends and well-wishers of China. As an American adviser has said, we may look upon this struggle "with a sigh, but never with a sneer."

II. THE BEARING OF THE WAR ON MISSIONARY TENDENCIES

In general it may be said that the war did not so much introduce new phenomena in missions as accentuate tendencies and movements already in progress. An article in *Millard's Review* of December 14, 1918, called "Studies in Mission Psychology," which reviewed thirty manuscripts submitted in a competition on the subject of War and Missions, said:

"Few of the points made by the writers are new; indeed it can be said that the articles deal more with acceleration of movements in existence before the war began than with new ones arising out of the war. . . . We may confidently expect, as these writers suggest, closer organization of the Christian forces, a more determined desire for self-support in the churches, and greater prominence of Chinese Christian leadership. The reconstruction necessary and possible along these lines

will result in progress in mission work not yet envisioned by the most radical, progressive prophet."

The general tendencies which were present in the missionary movement at the outbreak of the war and which have been given added impetus by it may be summarized as follows:

1. The movement toward unity and cooperation, already manifested in united efforts in educational lines, in union committees of evangelistic work in various centers, and in the Continuation Committee, has been accentuated. The union universities especially have grown, Peking University being the latest to be added to the list. At Nanking three churches and two nationalities have joined their forces in church organization. Everywhere the spirit of unity seems to have been strengthened.

2. The tendency towards more centralization of authority and responsibility, indicated by the organization of executive committees of the various missions and stations and the managing boards of the various educational institutions, has been strengthened.

3. The value of Chinese leadership, already recognized, has become axiomatic and it is taken for granted that no form of Christian work can succeed without it. The new organization of the Anglican Church is an example of this.

4. There is a further advance in the sense of responsibility of the native Church. This is strikingly illustrated in the mission undertaken by it to Yunnan, a project which was planned in the summer of 1918 and begun in the following spring for the evangelization of this interior province by the Chinese Church itself.

5. The increasing cordiality toward Christians as fellow-citizens and as identified with the nation's interests, manifest before the war, has been accentuated. In the wave of popular protest that swept the country in May and June after the Shantung decision was announced, the

students of Christian schools, by associating themselves with the government school students in this whole movement, won recognition for themselves as true patriots, a recognition which hitherto, on account of their studying in foreign schools, had not always been granted to them.

6. There is an increased emphasis on the relation of Christianity to the needs of the nation. Christianity is no longer regarded as hostile to the best interests of the republic. On the other hand, there are many Chinese who despair of any means of salvation for their nation except that offered by Christ. Students who have been away from China in America have remarked upon this new attitude of friendliness and welcome which has appeared during their absence from their country. If the distinction is held clearly between the true functions and respective positions of patriotism and religion, with no confusion or compromise in this regard, this new feeling should be of much value to the work of missions in China.

The acceleration in these tendencies mentioned above, due to the war, is evidenced in the steady growth of the adherents to Christianity. Although the women missionaries continued to increase, in 1915 their number being 3,235, and in 1917, 3,637, the number of men available for missionaries in China did not show the customary increase during the war, the figures in 1915 being 2,103 and in 1917, 2,263. But despite this temporary delay in reenforcements, the Christian Church continued to gain steadily, the baptized communicants in 1915 being 268,650, and in 1917, 312,970, the Christian constituency increasing in the same period from 526,108 to 654,658. There was a correspondingly large increase in the number of Chinese leaders in the work, and the conclusion is inevitable that despite the handicap of the war the growth of the Church has been steady and strong.¹

¹ See "Chinese Year Book for 1918," Appendix.

On the financial side it should be noted that the great demand for silver during the war brought about a marked change in its value. In 1915 a gold dollar would bring \$2.50 in Chinese silver. In 1919 the two were about at par. The effect of such a shift in values upon prospective building and upon current budgets is obvious.

A special problem in the situation created by the war concerns the German missionaries and the stoppage of their work. The German missionaries in China at the beginning of the war numbered 141 men and 68 women, with a constituency of 25,144 baptized Chinese Christians.² Of the sincerity and true contribution to the Christian cause of the majority of these missionaries there can be no doubt. On the other hand, there was a movement on foot in 1913 for the use of the German missions and especially of their mission schools for the advancement of the German *Weltpolitik*. Thus in a statement called "A Memorial for the Advancement of German Interests in China," issued by the German Association of Shanghai, a comparison was made between the schools of the Protestant missions of the English and Americans with those of Germany, and a policy was drawn up whereby the German schools would be increased and German influence thereby strengthened. The paper said:

"Only in their outward form should these schools be really mission schools; in their inner organizations they should be something between a mission school and another kind of school. . . . These schools would have to stand in a special relation to the mission, as they would be under a special organization with a school inspector, and also because the religious element would be of secondary importance to the national. . . . From a purely religious point of view the standpoint here put forward may seem somewhat questionable, but from our point of view it does not make so much difference.

² See A. J. Brown, Foreign Missions Conference, report of sub-committee on Missions and Government, January 15, 1918.

. . . . We must put forth our strength to the utmost, maintain a 'school and propaganda politik' on a large scale, and so safeguard for ourselves a part in China's economic development in keeping with our importance and the demands of our future." Signed, German Association, Shanghai, April, 1913.³

The deportation of the Germans altered entirely the situation of German missions in China. Some of the missionaries were exempted, but the work as a whole has been brought to a standstill. If it is to be carried forward, it will have to be done by agencies of other lands, at least for the near future.

III. THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

There are three political developments due to the war which may all have important effects upon the missionary movement in China. These are related to the changes in China's foreign relations with Japan, America, and the Allies in general.

What effect will Japan's increased power in China have upon missions? We can only forecast the future by a study of her past policy in Korea and her present attitude in Shantung. In April, 1915, a law against teaching religion in the mission schools in Korea was put in operation by the Japanese, the schools being given ten years in which to conform to this rule. Further, the attitude of the Government toward the Christian Church was revealed in the Korea Conspiracy Case in 1912, and in the suppression of the Korean movement for independence that began in March, 1919.

In Shantung one of the first steps of the Japanese Government has been the closing of certain mission schools in Tsingtao.⁴ The Japanese Government regards with suspicion any movement apparently controlled and

³ T. F. Millard, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," Appendix E.

⁴ A. J. Brown, "A Tenant in Shantung," *Asia*, September, 1919.

led by foreigners, whose general principles of democracy and individualism do not coincide with the governing principles of the Japanese State.

The hope for the future seems to lie in the strengthening of a more liberal party in Japan, until it can control the more conservative and less democratic forces. As a Japanese Christian pastor stated the situation: "The greatest crisis of Japan's history is impending. Militarism and imperialism have been the great hindrance to the propagation of the Gospel in Japan; missionaries, pastors, and evangelists have been considered by many as the enemies of militarism and imperialism, and consequently of Japan. If these two 'isms' could be destroyed, the way to Christ could be opened for the people of Japan."⁶

The outcome of the war has not adversely affected the influence of individual American missionaries living in China, as the Chinese have felt that, although these Americans have carefully refrained from any unwise participation in Chinese politics, on the whole they are in sympathy with the best interests of the Chinese Republic. When the effect of the Shantung decision upon China's attitude toward America as a whole is considered, we must be on our guard against too positive statements. Foreign missions is inextricably bound up with the foreign relations of the nations which the missionaries represent, and the attitude of the natives is affected by the attitude of these governments toward his own land. Hitherto America has always been regarded by the Chinese as their best and most trusted friend. Those who live and work in China hope that no act of foreign policy, present or future, will mar this traditional friendship and respect.

The same may be said of China's relations to the other Allies, as they are represented in the League of Nations.

⁶ Dr. Ebina, Conference of Federated Missions of Japan, 1918, quoted by J. E. Williams in Foreign Missions Conference Report, 1919.

Many of China's problems can best be solved through such cooperation of the nations as the League is supposed to represent. But as to the first definite application of the principles of the League to China, one of the Chinese delegates at Paris, a product of mission schools and of Christian education in America, said: "I have been much dazed by the inexplicable decision by the 'Big Three' over the Kiaochow question." This attitude may be taken as indicative of the present attitude of the Chinese as a whole toward the Allies, and this feeling will be reflected, in the near future at least, in their attitude toward missionaries from the Allied nations. Furthermore, the whole question of economic development and reconstruction in China, with the delicate subject of foreign financial control during the process, is bound up in China's relations with Japan, America, and the Allies. China will be developed, but will it be in her interests, or in the interests of an economic imperialism of other nations? How deeply will the spirit of Christianity permeate this contribution of the Occident to the Orient? "Will Christianity in China be able to subdue unto itself not only all that is alien to it in the religion and social life of the Chinese, but also all that is hostile to it in the trade and commerce of the West?"⁶ "No one close to the facts can doubt the truth of the statement that Western civilization is about to conquer the Orient. The real question is, not whether Western civilization can conquer the Orient, but whether Christianity will conquer Western civilization."⁷

The outcome is yet to be seen. But no doubt as to the future can blind us to the clamant needs of the present, the needs of a people great in history, in population, in potential resources, groping their way unsteadily toward

⁶ E. M. Marrins, "The War's Effect on Missions in China," *The Churchman*, July, 1919.

⁷ John L. Childs, "Result of the War on Missionary Work in China," *Millard's Review*, December 14, 1918.

dimly perceived ideals of democracy and liberty and the life of a more modern age; a people whose need today is for sympathetic support and aid on the part of her sister nations, and whose paramount need is for Christ. And no doubt about the outcome can alter or shake in any way our confidence in the One who first gave the command for the mission campaign throughout the world, who Himself is the chief cornerstone in any structure, individual, national, or international, that we may strive to build.